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Reid on Moral Sentimentalism 
Camil Golub 
This is the author’s accepted manuscript for an article published in Res Philosophica. The final 
publication is available via DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1815. 
 
Abstract: In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man V. 7, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat 
moral approbation implies a real judgment,” contrasting this thesis with the view that moral 
approbation is no more than a feeling. Unfortunately, his criticism of moral sentimentalism 
systematically conflates two different metaethical views: non-cognitivism about moral thought 
and subjectivism about moral properties. However, if we properly disentangle the various parts 
of Reid's discussion, we can isolate pertinent arguments against each of these views. Some of 
these arguments, such as the argument from disagreement and the argument from implausible 
counterfactuals against subjectivism, or the transparency argument against non-cognitivism, still 
have important roles to play in contemporary metaethics. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat moral 
Approbation implies a real Judgment” (EAP V. 7, 344),1 contrasting this thesis with the view that 
“moral approbation and disapprobation are not judgments, which must be true or false, but (...) 
agreeable and uneasy feelings or sensations” (EAP V. 7, 345). Given this statement of intentions, 
we might expect Reid to make a case for what we would now call moral cognitivism―the view 
that moral judgments are truth-apt, representational mental states―and argue against something 
 
1 Citations to the Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Reid 1787 [2010]) are to “EAP,” followed by Essay, Section, 
and page number in the Edinburgh University Press edition. 
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resembling moral non-cognitivism, i.e., the view that the mental states expressed by moral claims 
are non-cognitive attitudes, which cannot be true or false.2 
However, Reid begins his discussion by suggesting that the question whether moral 
approbation involves a real judgment only arose because of the ascent of the theory of ideas: the 
view that in the moral domain we are dealing with real, truth-apt judgments was the default one, 
he says, before Locke and others introduced the theory of secondary qualities with respect to 
properties such as color, sound and heat. As Reid tells the story, once it became accepted that 
such properties are mere feelings or sensations in our minds, the theory of secondary qualities 
was naturally extended to matters of taste and then to morality, as the view that moral 
approbation and disapprobation are mere feelings. 
This association of moral non-cognitivism with the idea of secondary qualities is 
puzzling. If by moral approbation/disapprobation we understand the mental state expressed by a 
sincere utterance of a moral claim such as “Genocide is wrong,” then it does not follow from a 
secondary quality theory of morality that moral approbation and disapprobation are mere feelings 
or non-cognitive in nature.3 Indeed, cognitivism is a natural fit for a secondary quality theory 
about any domain of discourse. For instance, if someone claims that colors are mere sensations 
in the mind, or capacities in external objects to produce certain sensations in our minds, then she 
will naturally embrace the view that color judgments are truth-apt beliefs about such subjective 
 
2 To be sure, Reid never uses the terms cognitivism and non-cognitivism, which were introduced into philosophical 
usage in the 20th century, but he seems to have in mind the views denoted by these terms. I should also note that 
many contemporary non-cognitivists will appeal to a minimalist account of truth in order to say that, even though 
moral claims express non-cognitive mental states, they can be true or false. See, e.g., Blackburn (1984, 1993) and 
Gibbard (2003). More on the version of non-cognitivism targeted by Reid and its relevance for contemporary 
metaethics, in section 3. 
3 Stecker (1987) proposes a different understanding of moral approbation, on which it refers to the mental state 
expressed by an utterance of “I approve of x,” which is related to moral thinking but is not the mental state 
expressed by moral claims. I will examine his argument for this reading in section 2. 
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or sensation-dependent properties. Similarly, someone who accepts a secondary quality theory of 
morality will normally hold that moral claims express real, truth-apt judgments about moral 
properties understood as subjective properties―i.e., as properties dependent on our feelings or 
attitudes. (Let us call such a view moral subjectivism, following contemporary usage.) 
Conversely, those who hold that moral claims do not express truth-apt judgments, but feelings or 
some other kind of non-cognitive attitudes, will typically deny that there are such things as moral 
properties, no matter how such properties are to be understood. 
In other words, Reid seems to be conflating two different questions about moral claims: 
whether they express truth-apt judgments or mere feelings; and whether they concern objective, 
mind-independent moral properties or subjective properties, dependent on our affective 
responses to non-moral features of the world.4 And as a result of this conflation, he seems to treat 
as one view―labeled as the thesis that moral approbation includes no more than a feeling―what 
should be seen as two distinct sentimentalist conceptions of moral discourse: non-cognitivism 
and subjectivism. Or, at least, he seems to assume that non-cognitivism entails subjectivism or 
viceversa, a claim that would nowadays be rejected by many metaethicists, and in any case 
would need substantial argument.5 
 This conflation of non-cognitivism and subjectivism is perhaps understandable in Reid’s 
historical context, and especially given that his explicit target in EAP V. 7 is David Hume, whose 
 
4 Reid does take morality to be mind-dependent in a certain sense: the primary bearers of moral properties are mental 
features of the relevant agents, such as intentions or characters. But he denies that moral properties depend on any 
observer's feelings or attitudes toward those mental qualities. This is what I mean by mind-independent here, 
following standard usage in metaethics.  
An anonymous reviewer suggests that Reid might have a different complaint against secondary quality 
views of morality: we cannot reduce moral judgments to judgments about our feelings, because moral judgments 
have normative content, while judgments about feelings do not. However, the question of how we can account for 
the normative content of moral judgments is independent of whether moral claims express truth-apt or “real” 
judgments, and Reid is only concerned with the latter question in EAP V. 7. 
5 Again, Reid never uses the terms non-cognitivism and subjectivism. But he does talk about the ideas to which these 
contemporary terms refer, and this is enough to allow us to critically examine his treatment of these views.  
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sentimentalist conception of morality notoriously includes both non-cognitivist and subjectivist 
elements. Indeed, earlier in the EAP we find textual evidence that Reid did take Hume to endorse 
both subjectivism and non-cognitivism. Here is how he reconstructs Hume's view on moral 
approbation: 
Moral approbation or disapprobation is not an act of the judgment, which, like all acts of 
judgment, must be true or false, it is only a certain feeling, which, from the constitution of 
human nature, arises upon contemplating certain characters or qualities of mind coolly or 
impartially. This feeling, when agreeable, is moral approbation; when disagreeable, 
disapprobation. The qualities of mind which produce this agreeable feeling are the moral 
virtues, and those that produce the disagreeable, the vices. (EAP V. 5, 301-302) 
Note the seamless transition from non-cognitivism to subjectivism in this passage: Reid seems to 
treat the non-cognitivist idea that moral approbation and disapprobation consist in certain 
agreeable or disagreeable feelings as equivalent, or at least intimately tied, to the subjectivist 
thought that moral properties consist in those qualities of mind which produce such feelings. And 
this conflation permeates the entire discussion of sentimentalism in EAP V. 7. Again, Hume may 
well have accepted both of these ideas, or close versions thereof. But even this is true, Reid's 
critical discussion of sentimentalism will still confuse present-day readers, because it treats non-
cognitivism and subjectivism as two sides of the same sentimentalist thesis, rather than 
distinguishing these elements of Hume's thought as independent targets for criticism. 
I suspect that Reid's failure to distinguish between non-cognitivism and subjectivism 
explains, at least in part, why EAP V. 7 has received little attention from Reid scholars. While 
there has been much discussion of Reid's positive view on the role of feelings and affections in 
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moral thought in recent decades,6 his criticism of moral sentimentalism has been largely ignored 
so far.7 This might seem wholly appropriate: it is easy to read this section of the EAP and dismiss 
Reid's arguments as a case against non-cognitivism that is largely misguided, because based on a 
confusion about the relation between non-cognitivism and subjectivism. 
However, I believe a more fertile approach to this section of the EAP is to set aside Reid's 
conflation of the two forms of sentimentalism and disentangle the arguments that might work 
against non-cognitivism from those that apply to subjectivism. Once we do this, we can 
appreciate the strength and in some cases the originality of his arguments against each of these 
sentimentalist views. Some of these arguments, such as the argument from disagreement and the 
argument from counter-intuitive counterfactuals against subjectivism, or the transparency 
argument against non-cognitivism, still have important roles to play in contemporary metaethics. 
Thus, my aim in this paper is to identify and articulate these arguments in terms allowed by the 
progress made in metaethics since Reid's time. 
In section 2, I will discuss those of Reid’s arguments that apply to subjectivism, but 
would be misguided if directed at non-cognitivism. This will also be a good place to argue 
against Stecker’s (1987) reading of what goes on in Reid’s critique of sentimentalism. 
 
6 See Cuneo (2006, 2008), Roeser (2009), Broadie (2010), Lehrer (2010), Kroeker (2011, 2018), Folescu (2018). 
Commentators agree that, for Reid, moral judgment is not sentimental in nature, but is nevertheless accompanied by 
feelings or affections as a matter of natural necessity: we are constituted in such a way that, whenever we form 
moral judgments, we also form appropriate affective states in an immediate and unreflective manner. In other words, 
for Reid, moral evaluation as a complex mental state is constituted in part by an affective state. (What he rejects is a 
pure sentimentalist view on which moral approbation amounts to no more than a feeling.) Broadie argues that, on 
Reid’s view, the function of feelings is to motivate us to act in accordance with moral judgments, while Kroeker 
argues that affections are part of moral evaluations but need not be involved in moral motives. Roeser suggests that 
affective states also play a role in the acquisition of moral knowledge on Reid's view, and Folescu further explores 
this epistemological idea.  
7 Only Stecker (1987) and Cuneo (2004) have discussed in detail Reid's arguments in EAP V. 7, which they see as 
targeting only non-cognitivism. Cuneo (2011) also suggests that Reid's arguments in this section of the EAP are 
directed at Hume's sentimentalism understood as a version of non-cognitivism.  
 
 6 
In section 3, I will discuss those arguments given by Reid that apply to non-cognitivism, 
but not to subjectivism. I will argue that Reid works with an overly narrow notion of feeling, 
thus targeting a particularly implausible version of non-cognitivism, but one of his arguments 
can be extended to the more interesting non-cognitivist views that are prominent today. 
 
2. Arguments against Subjectivism 
We find in Reid arguments that are standardly offered against subjectivism in contemporary 
metaethics: the argument from implausible counterfactuals, the same meaning argument, and the 
argument from disagreement. But it would be easy to dismiss these as failed arguments against 
non-cognitivism, given that Reid's formulation of sentimentalism has a distinct non-cognitivist 
flavor and that he does not seem to distinguish between this view and subjectivism. Again, I 
believe a more fruitful approach is to focus on what Reid's text might have to tell us about 
subjectivism and its problems. 
 
The Argument from Implausible Counterfactuals 
Let us start with the argument from implausible counterfactuals, found in the following passage: 
If what we call moral judgment be no real judgment, but merely a feeling, it follows that the 
principles of morals (…) have no other foundation than an arbitrary structure and fabric in 
the constitution of the human mind: so that, by a change in our structure, what is immoral 
might become moral, virtue might be turned into vice, and vice into virtue. (EAP V. 7, 361-
362) 
As Stecker (1987, 461) notes, this argument seems to be explicitly directed against what we 
would now call emotivism, or non-cognitivism more generally, and thus read it is a bad 
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argument.8 The idea that moral claims express non-cognitive attitudes does not entail that moral 
facts or properties are contingent on our attitudes, so non-cognitivists need not claim that, if our 
subjective makeup were substantially different, what is morally right or wrong would be 
different. Emotivists in A.J. Ayer’s tradition will typically refuse to engage in any talk of moral 
truths, facts or properties, while more refined non-cognitivists will treat questions about what the 
moral facts would be in counterfactual circumstances as normative issues, internal to moral 
discourse, and will reject the contingency of moral truths on our feelings or attitudes as morally 
abhorrent―taking this verdict to express one of their actual feelings or attitudes.9 
 In this passage, we find then a clear instance of Reid's failure to distinguish between non-
cognitivism and subjectivism about morality: Reid mistakenly thought he was targeting one 
sentimentalist position, according to which moral claims express mere feelings and moral facts 
depend on those feelings. But these are independent theses, and problems that arise for one of 
them, such as the problem of implausible counterfactuals, need not apply to the other. 
However, let us set aside this conflation of the two sentimentalist views and point out that 
Reid anticipates here one of the most important arguments against moral subjectivism, which is 
still routinely invoked in contemporary metaethical debates. On most subjectivist views, moral 
truths are contingent on subjective psychological facts, and would be different if the subjective 
facts were substantially different. If we cannot accept such counterfactual consequences, then we 
should reject the subjectivist views that lead to them. 
Now, this need not be the end of the debate. Subjectivists might respond by denying that 
their view has these implausible consequences, or they might bite the bullet and try to explain 
 
8 Cuneo (2004) offers a reading similar to Stecker's. 
9 See, e.g., Blackburn (1993), Essay 8, or Gibbard (2003), Ch. 9. 
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away our intuitions about the relevant counterfactuals.10 But whether or not Reid's objection to 
subjectivism is decisive, it deserves to be acknowledged as such, rather than simply being 
dismissed as a confused argument against non-cognitivism. 
 
The Same Meaning Argument 
Following Cuneo (2004), I will call the second argument that I want to discuss the same meaning 
argument: if moral approbation were nothing more than a feeling, Reid argues, then a claim such 
as “x is good” would either have the same meaning as “x gives me an agreeable feeling,” or it 
would mean nothing at all. But “x is good” does mean something, and it means something 
different from “x gives me an agreeable feeling”: “The first [statement] expresses plainly an 
opinion or judgment of the conduct of the man, but says nothing of the speaker. The second only 
testifies a fact concerning the speaker, to wit, that he had such a feeling.” (EAP V. 7, 350) 
Therefore, Reid concludes, it is not the case that moral approbation is a mere feeling.  
First, let us try to reconstruct this as an argument against non-cognitivism: if non-
cognitivism is true, then “x is good” either has the same meaning as “x gives me an agreeable 
feeling” or it means nothing, but none of these options is true.  
Thus stated, this argument could be given a reading on which it would be valid, but quite 
odd. If by meaning nothing Reid understood having no propositional or representational content, 
then it would indeed follow from the truth of non-cognitivism that “x is good” means nothing or 
 
10 Some subjectivists (e.g., Wiggins 1998) try to accommodate these worries about the counterfactual variation of 
moral facts by rigidifying moral terms, i.e., by tying their extension in every possible world to our actual feelings or 
attitudes. This allows them to say, e.g., that murder would be wrong in any possible world, given that “wrong” as 
used by them refers to a property involving their actual attitudes, which do not condone murder. But even such 
subjectivists will have to accept that someone with substantially different feelings or attitudes could speak truthfully 
in uttering “Murder is not wrong”. 
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it has the same meaning as “x gives me an agreeable feeling,” but the second disjunct would be 
completely idle in the argument. I find this reading implausible. 
A more plausible interpretation, offered by Cuneo, is that Reid claims that, if it were true 
that moral approbation was nothing more than an agreeable feeling, then “x is good” would have 
the same meaning as “x gives me an agreeable feeling,” and he uses the other disjunct (that “x is 
good” has no meaning) rhetorically rather than as a live possibility.  
However, on this more plausible reading, we are dealing with a bad argument: non-
cognitivism does not entail that moral claims are synonymous with reports of subjective facts. 
Indeed, a standard way of introducing non-cognitivism as a distinct metaethical view is to 
distinguish between expressing an attitude and describing that attitude or attributing it to oneself. 
Once again, Reid seems to be conflating non-cognitivism and subjectivism. 
Let us put aside, though, this new instance of Reid's failure to separate the two 
sentimentalist views, and focus on the fact that Reid provides here a potentially powerful 
argument against subjectivism: if subjectivism were true, then “x is good” would mean the same 
as “x gives me an agreeable feeling”; but this does not cohere with our semantic intuitions and 
our use of these expressions; therefore, subjectivism is false.  
To be sure, this is not a knock-out argument either: subjectivists who do accept the 
equivalence in meaning between moral claims and reports of subjective attitudes might respond 
to this objection by ascribing semantic blindness to ordinary speakers, or by presenting their 
proposal as a revisionary semantics for moral discourse. Other subjectivists will claim that 
subjectivism is only a thesis about the truth conditions of moral claims, not about their semantic 
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content.11 But we are dealing here with a respectable argument that people still use against 
subjectivism to this day.  
Stecker (1987) has a different take on this argument, and more generally on what goes on 
in Reid's rejection of sentimentalism. When Reid is considering the hypothesis that moral 
approbation is a mere feeling, he is not examining a metaethical view about the content of moral 
claims, says Stecker, but the independent thesis that “an approval of an object is an 
introspectively discernible feeling or sensation” (457). From this supposition, however, it does 
not follow that a moral claim such as “x is good” means nothing, nor that it means the same as “x 
gives me an agreeable feeling.” 
On this reading, therefore, the argument is blatantly invalid, illegitimately deriving 
conclusions about the content of moral claims from an irrelevant supposition about what it is to 
approve of something. Despite these costs, Stecker takes this to be the only plausible reading of 
Reid's argument. He acknowledges that an alternative reading could be given, on which Reid 
uses moral approbation to refer to the mental state of judging someone's conduct to be 
good―that is, the mental state expressed by a sincere utterance of “x is good.” Furthermore, 
Stecker concedes that, on this reading, the argument would make more sense, given that the 
antecedent and the consequent of the conditional premise would concern the same thing: what is 
expressed by moral claims such as “x is good.” But he dismisses this alternative reading with the 
following argument: in offering a reductio of moral sentimentalism, Reid cannot ascribe to the 
sentimentalist the thesis that moral approbation, understood as judging someone's conduct to be 
good, is a mere feeling, given that Reid takes sentimentalism to be precisely the view that moral 
approbation is not a judgment.  
 
11 See, for instance, the relativist theories defended by Kölbel (2007) or MacFarlane (2014). 
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I find Stecker's argument unconvincing. First of all, we need not even use the term judge 
in offering the alternative reading rejected by Stecker. As I have already suggested, we can 
formulate the antecedent of the same meaning argument as follows: “if the mental state 
expressed by a sincere utterance of ‘x is good’ is a mere feeling…”. The sentimentalist can say 
these words without contradicting his claim that moral approbation does not include a real 
judgment. Indeed, these ideas are two sides of the same coin: the non-cognitivist view that moral 
approbation―the mental state expressed by a sincere utterance of “x is good”―is a mere feeling 
and does not include a real judgment.  
Secondly, even if we employed Stecker's terms, it is true that, if Reid understood by 
moral approbation the mental state of judging someone's conduct to be good, then he would be 
ascribing to the sentimentalist the position that judging someone's conduct to be good is not a 
judgment. But this claim is not a contradiction if judge/judgment is used here in two different 
senses: first, in the weak sense of whatever mental state is expressed by a sincere utterance of “x 
is good,” and then in the strong sense of real judgment―that is, a belief-like mental state with 
representational content. Or, we could attribute to the sentimentalist a vicarious use of the term 
judge in its first occurrence, so that what he is claiming is: what people usually call judging 
someone's conduct to be good is not a (real) judgment. This is not an incoherent claim, so Reid 
could legitimately use it as a statement of sentimentalism in the same meaning argument.12 
 
The Argument from Disagreement 
Closely related to the same meaning argument is Reid's argument from disagreement: if “x is 
good” and “x gives me an agreeable feeling” had the same meaning, then in disagreeing with 
 
12 Indeed, Reid explicitly renders the sentimentalist position in these terms in the argument from implausible 
counterfactuals, quoted above: “If what we call moral judgment be no real judgment, but merely a feeling...”. 
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someone uttering “x is good” we would be offending them, by accusing them of insincerity with 
respect to their own feelings: “[A]s every man must know his own feelings, to deny that a man 
had a feeling which he affirms he had, is to charge him with falsehood.” (EAP V. 7, 350) But we 
do not offend anyone in this manner when we reject moral claims, given that in that case we are 
dealing with “a difference of opinion, which, to a reasonable man, gives no offence” (350). 
Therefore, Reid concludes, “x is good” means something else than “x gives me an agreeable 
feeling.” 
This is not quite the same argument from disagreement against subjectivism that would 
later be offered by Moore (1912) and Ayer (1936), and which one often hears presented as the 
most important reason not to be a subjectivist: if subjectivism were true, then utterances of “x is 
good” and “x is not good” made by different speakers could not be in disagreement, given that 
they would report independent subjective facts about the two speakers. But the core idea is the 
same, and Reid puts his finger here on one of the most important vulnerabilities of subjectivism, 
long before debate about these issues took off in the 20th century.  
This argument from disagreement, like the other arguments discussed above, applies to 
subjectivism, but would be misguided if directed at non-cognitivism: if moral claims have no 
cognitive content and no truth value, then we would not be offending anyone in rejecting such 
claims, at least not by questioning the sincerity of the speaker or her epistemic authority with 
regard to her own feelings.13 So, given that the argument comes as a further reductio of the 
supposition that moral approbation is a mere feeling, it would be easy to see Reid as trying and 
failing to argue here against non-cognitivism. However, I believe we should once again set aside 
 
13 Stecker (1987) claims that the argument from disagreement applies to both subjectivism and emotivism, but it is 
hard to see how the argument as stated by Reid could apply to emotivism, for the reason I give here.  
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Reid's failure to distinguish the different forms of sentimentalism, and give him credit for having 
identified a major weakness of subjectivism.  
 
3. Arguments against Non-cognitivism 
Let us turn our attention now to those of Reid's arguments that do not apply to subjectivism but 
might have teeth against non-cognitivism.  
These arguments have not stood the test of time as well as Reid's arguments against 
subjectivism. They seem to target a particularly implausible version of non-cognitivism, which 
involves an overly narrow notion of feeling: on this view, moral claims express affective states 
that (1) are non-intentional, and (2) cannot be expressed through propositions, where by 
proposition Reid means a sentence that includes a verb in the indicative mood. Indeed, such a 
non-cognitivist view seems to be trivially inadequate as an account of moral discourse, given that 
most moral claims do have a propositional form.14 Another way of putting what is wrong with 
Reid's characterization of feelings is that, by claiming that that the affective states that non-
cognitivism ascribes as the content of moral claims cannot be expressed in a propositional form, 
he begs the questions against this sentimentalist conception of moral discourse.  
However, if we examine Reid's reasoning against non-cognitivism more closely, we will 
find a more interesting objection, which has some force even against the more refined versions of 
non-cognitivism that we find in contemporary metaethics. I will start by briefly discussing Reid's 
less powerful arguments, and then move on to the interesting one. 
 
 
 
14 From among the kinds of sentences involved in moral discourse, very few (e.g., imperatives) would not qualify as 
propositions in Reid's sense. 
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The Argument from the Non-intentionality of Feeling 
In setting up the discussion about the content of moral approbation, Reid offers the following 
explication of the difference between feeling and judgment: “In judgment, we can distinguish the 
object about which we judge, from the act of the mind in judging of that object. In mere feeling 
there is no such distinction.” (EAP V. 7, 347) In other words, we cannot distinguish between the 
object of a feeling and the feeling itself, while we can distinguish the object of judgment from 
judgment as a mental state. This is meant to support Reid's claim that moral approbation involves 
a real judgment, given that, in the case of the mental state expressed by moral claims, we are able 
to distinguish between the object of the mental state and the mental state itself. Let us call this 
the argument from the non-intentionality of feeling.  
First, we should note the obvious: this argument would be irrelevant in a discussion about 
subjectivism; in the case of a judgment about one's feelings, we can distinguish between the 
object of the belief―the subject's feelings―and the belief itself. So this argument can only target 
non-cognitivism.  
Now, this argument from non-intentionality would work against a non-cognitivist view 
that took the content of moral claims to be feelings understood as simple, non-intentional 
affective states. But this is not the only kind of affective states that non-cognitivists can appeal 
to: they can take the contents of moral claims to be structured conative attitudes, which take as 
objects persons, actions or states of affairs. For instance, a non-cognitivist might claim that 
“Lying is wrong” expresses one's disapproval of lying, or one's plan to refrain from lying and 
discourage others from lying, or some similar attitude that concerns lying. Moreover, Reid 
should be well aware of this: in discussing the motivational states associated with moral 
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judgment, he distinguishes between affections―which are intentional affective states―and 
feelings, which are simple and non-intentional (EAP V. 7, 349). 
Therefore, even if Reid is right in saying that feelings cannot be the content of moral 
claims, due to their stipulated non-intentional character, this leaves open the possibility that 
moral claims express affections, and no real judgments. Given that this is precisely the type of 
view defended by non-cognitivists nowadays,15 Reid's argument from the non-intentionality of 
feeling has little relevance for contemporary metaethics. 
 
The Argument from Non-propositionality 
Reid offers a second characterization of feelings, which is also meant to undermine the view that 
moral approbation is a mere feeling. Unlike judgments, he says, feelings cannot be expressed in a 
propositional form: 
A feeling (...) is expressed in language either by a single word, or by such a contexture of 
words as may be the subject or predicate of a proposition, but such as cannot by themselves 
make a proposition. For it implies neither affirmation nor negation; and therefore cannot 
have the qualities of true or false, which distinguish propositions from all other forms of 
speech, and judgments from all other acts of mind. (EAP V. 7, 346) 
We can call this the argument from non-propositionality. 
Again, let us first note that this argument does not concern subjectivism in any way. 
Indeed, Reid distinguishes in this very context between the expression of a feeling, which he 
says cannot have a propositional form, and the report that one has a certain feeling, which is 
 
15 See, e.g., Gibbard's (2003) plan-based expressivist semantics. 
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obviously propositional: “That I have such a feeling, is indeed an affirmative proposition, and 
expresses testimony grounded upon an intuitive judgment.” (EAP V. 7, 346) Thus, Reid himself 
puts subjectivism on the logical map here, and acknowledges that it would be immune to the 
argument from non-propositionality, which makes it even more puzzling why Reid conflates 
non-cognitivism and subjectivism throughout the rest of this section of the EAP. 
Now, this argument does not do much damage against non-cognitivism either: to argue 
that the mental states ascribed by non-cognitivists as the contents of moral claims cannot be 
expressed in assertoric form is simply to beg the question against non-cognitivism. The central 
thesis of non-cognitivism is that, although moral claims look like ordinary assertions, they do not 
have genuine representational content, but express some other kind of mental states. One is free, 
of course, to insist that grammatical assertions can only have representational content, but this is 
no argument against non-cognitivists. It is just a rejection of their view.  
Note, moreover, that the weakness of this argument is independent of the question of 
what kind of affective state is involved in the non-cognitivist semantics: the argument from non-
propositionality is dialectically ineffective not only against the more refined versions of non-
cognitivism that take structured, intentional attitudes as the content of moral claims, but also 
against the implausible emotivism explicitly targeted by Reid, according to which moral claims 
express simple, non-intentional mental states. 
 
The Transparency Argument 
Reid does offer a more interesting and, to my knowledge, original argument against non-
cognitivism, which may be called the transparency argument. Non-cognitivists typically concede 
that assertoric language usually conveys representational contents, and that moral discourse is an 
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exception to this rule. Thus, they claim that a set of linguistic devices (grammatical assertions, 
predicates, etc.) that are typically used to convey representational contents is used, in the moral 
case, for the very different purpose of expressing non-cognitive attitudes. Reid finds it 
inexplicable that this unnatural use of superficially descriptive linguistic items would be found in 
all human languages: 
A particular language may have some oddity, or even absurdity, introduced by some man of 
eminence, from caprice or wrong judgment, and followed, by servile imitators, for a time, 
and, of consequences, discountenanced and dropt; but that the same absurdity should 
pervade all languages, through all ages, and that, after being detected and exposed, it should 
still keep its countenance and its place in language as much as before, this can never be 
while men have understanding. (EAP V. 7, 351) 
In other words, non-cognitivists seem to owe us an explanation of the universal lack of 
transparency that they attribute to moral discourse: it cannot be a mere coincidence that, in all 
languages, non-representational moral contents are expressed through improper means, instead 
of being expressed solely through imperatives, interjections and other linguistic devices that 
seem more appropriate for conveying feelings and affections.16 
Given how Reid defines the notion of feeling, this argument explicitly targets the 
uninteresting version of non-cognitivism on which moral claims express simple, unintentional 
mental states. But it can be extended to more refined versions of non-cognitivism as well. Non-
cognitivist views according to which moral claims express structured, intentional affective states 
are not immune to this transparency challenge.  
 
16 Cuneo (2004) offers a similar reconstruction of this argument. 
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Now, this might not be an insurmountable problem for non-cognitivism either. For 
instance, non-cognitivists might respond by offering a general account of the function of 
assertoric linguistic devices, which applies across the board to both representational and non-
representational regions of discourse.17 But this is not the place to place to explore possible non-
cognitivist solutions to this problem. My purpose here, as in the previous section, has been to 
identify those arguments in the EAP V. 7 that metaethicists might still find useful today.  
We may be frustrated at first with the fundamental confusion about non-cognitivism and 
subjectivism that plagues Reid's discussion of moral sentimentalism. But once we disentangle 
and reconstruct his various arguments and direct them at their proper targets, we can appreciate 
that most of these arguments are still relevant to figuring out whether moral claims express 
representational beliefs or non-cognitive attitudes, and whether they capture an objective moral 
reality or our subjective attitudes toward the non-moral world. In other words, they can still be 
used to assess the prospects of non-cognitivism and subjectivism about morality. 
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